Using official data this paper evaluates India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) according to the following criteria: a) average number of days of employment per household; b) percentage of households completing 100 days of employment under NREGS; c) percentage of expenditure against total available funds; and d) percentage of work completed. Performance across the first two criteria has been disappointing and has deteriorated over time. Percentage of expenditure against total available funds has risen sharply, particularly since 2010-11 and has been consistently higher than work completed as a percentage of work planned. Further, the two trends have begun to diverge since 2010-11. It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the NREGS has not performed well. The paper makes a number of policy suggestions to improve the performance of the NREGS.
India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme as it is -
Interpreting the Official Report
I. Introduction
The National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (henceforth NREGS) has been hailed as India's most ambitious anti-poverty intervention. The NREGS came into effect in November In the budget of 2012-13 the amount set aside for NREGS was Rs. 40,000 crores.
Although there has been earmarking of the class of projects that would be taken up by NREGS workers, it was never made clear how this resulting work would be assessed. No cost-benefit analysis or impact assessment was ever done.
Against this backdrop, it is important to ask three key questions: a) how much benefits have accrued from this program to eligible workers, b) whether these benefits have persisted over time, and c) how much and what type of work was completed using labour employed in NREGS projects and how useful were they?
The first issue can be addressed using household level cross section data and some dimensions have been addressed in a series of papers for selected states (Jha et al. 2009 , for employment and Jha et al. 2011a , for nutritional impact and Jha et al. 2012b for net transfers). 1 The second issue can only be addressed using household level panel data to track the movement of workers in and out of employment in the NREGS. Jha et al. (2011b) provide some evidence on this using household level panel data for Rajasthan. The present paper addresses the third question. In doing so, we rely on the government's own reports on the NREGS (GOI, 2012a) We analyze the results according to four criteria: a) average number of days of employment per household; b) percentage of households completing 100 days of employment under NREGS; c) percentage of expenditure against total available funds; and d) percentage of work completed. The first two criteria are addressed using data from Government of India (2012a) whereas the third and fourth criteria are addressed using data from Government of India (2012b). The plan of this paper is as follows. In section II we report on the results and section III concludes with some policy recommendations.
II. Results
Despite rapid economic growth in recent years India's problem of unemployment remains In Table 3 we report on percentage of expenditure undertaken of funds set aside for six years: 
III. Conclusions
This paper has assessed India's NREGS according to four criteria: i) average number of days worked per household under NREGS; ii) percentage of households completing 100 days of employment; iii) percentage of allocated funds spent; and iv) percentage of work completed.
Performance across all four criteria has been disappointing and deteriorated over time.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that the NREGS has not performed well. In these days of very high fiscal and current account deficits it is difficult to rationalize providing even more funds to this initiative. Documents of the 2012-13 budget (GOI, 2012c) reveal that in 2011-12 the fertilizer subsidy was Rs. 62,301.21 crore, food subsidy was Rs.
63,843.79 crore, and the Petroleum subsidy was 38,371.32 crore. When these figures are juxtaposed against the nearly Rs.17,000 crore which was the unspent amount in the NREGS budget in -12 (Economic Times, 2011 it is evident that this alone amounted to almost 44 per cent of the fuel subsidy. This is a stark manifestation of failure in designing and implementing appropriate projects with a likely substantial impact on the village economy.
Another serious failure is tiny fractions of households availing of the mandated employment of 100 days of work despite a hugely attractive wage rate far in excess of prevailing agricultural wage rates. Reports abound of corruption at all stages with participants obtaining wages that are often long delayed and, worse, unrelated to work done and wages earned.
Project activity is dull or highly uneven with siphoning-off of funds earmarked. Village
Panchayats and local officials are not silent or helpless spectators of the gravy train but key to keeping it going. Even though official claims of higher agricultural wage rates and lower migration are mostly exaggerated, if not fantasized, field-reports suggest a growing sense of entitlements among the deprived. For this reason alone, the temptation to scrap NREGS must be resisted. Instead, a solution lies in a drastic overhaul of this scheme with greater transparency and accountability through social audits. The new guidelines announced by the Ministry of Rural Development are a substantive response to these concerns. But whether the impact on the poor will be much greater, in particular to justify the expenditure on the program, time alone will tell. 
